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SECTION 98 AND THE SPECIALIZED
PRACTICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
JAMES A. GARDNER*

In Stropnicky v. Nathanson,l the Massachusetts Commission
Against Discrimination ("MCAD") ruled that Judith Nathanson vi
olated a Massachusetts antidiscrimination statute by confining her
law practice to the feminist-oriented representation of women in
divorce proceedings. Some of the participants in this Symposium
have criticized the Agency's decision on constitutiOIial or jurispru
dential grounds, but I think the ruling suffers from a more funda
mental problem: it rests on a poor reading of the underlying statute.
My argument, reduced to its essence, is simply this: it is perverse to
interpret a civil rights statute in a way that curtails the effectiveness
and availability of civil rights representation.
I.

A.

THE AGENCY'S READING OF THE STATUTE

The MeAD Ruling

Section 98 of Chapter 272 of the Massachusetts General Laws
provides:
Whoever makes any distinction, discrimination or restriction on
account of ... sex ... relative to the admission of any person to,
or his treatment in any place of public accommodation, . . . as
defined in section ninety-two A, ... shall be punished ....2

Section 92A of Chapter 272 defines a "place of public accommoda
tion" as "any place ... which is open to and accepts or solicits the
patronage of the general public.... "3 This language is followed by
ten nonexclusive examples, including an "establishment ... dispens
ing personal services .... "4 In his opinion for the Agency, the
Hearing Commissioner found that the practice of law involves the
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. Thanks to
Anne Goldstein and Val Vojdik for commenting on an earlier draft.
1. 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39 (MeAD Feb. 25, 1997).
2. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (1997).
3. /d. § 92A.
4. [d. § 92A(3).
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dispensing of personal services and that Nathanson had advertised
her services to the general public, thereby soliciting its business.
Consequently, her law office was a "place of public accommoda
tion" within the meaning of Section 92A,5 and she was thus re
quired to comply with the nondiscrimination requirements of
Section 98.
The Hearing Commissioner found Nathanson liable under Sec
tion 98 by a seemingly straightforward application of precedent.
Nathanson had refused to represent Joseph Stropnicky, a male
seeking representation in a divorce proceeding, a fact that Nathan
son did not dispute. Stropnicky thus made out an undisputed prima
facie case of discrimination by showing that he was a member of a
class protected by the statute (males), and that he was denied ser
vice in a place of public accommodation. 6 Nathanson's refusal to
represent Strop nicky, the Hearing Commissioner held, thus consti
tuted a denial of service amounting to a "distinction, discrimination
or restriction" within the meaning of Section 98,7 and he ordered
Nathanson to pay a fine of $5,000. 8

B.

Legal Specialization as Discrimination

Let us assume that the Hearing Commissioner correctly found
Nathanson's law office to be a place of public accommodation sub
ject to the nondiscrimination requirement of Section 98. It does not
follow nearly so directly, however, that Nathanson's refusal to rep
resent Stropnicky constitutes "discrimination" within the meaning
of Section 98.
How, precisely, does prohibited discrimination occur under
Section 98? The examples given in Section 92A reveal the statutory
paradigm of illegal discrimination: a retail store offers to sell mer
chandise to the public, but refuses to sell to blacks;9 a hotel offers to
rent rooms to the public but refuses to rent to gays;10 a restaurant
offers to serve meals to the public but refuses to serve Jews. l l In
each case, a service that is offered generally to the public is denied
solely on the basis of some statutorily protected trait. In
Stropnicky, MCAD made an obvious attempt to force Nathanson's
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Stropnicky, 19 M.D.L.R. at 40-41.
See id. at 41.
Id.
See id. at 42.
See § 92A(3).
See id. § 92A(1).
11. See id. § 92A(4).
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behavior into this mold. The Hearing Commissioner found, for ex
ample, that Nathanson "practices law for a profit," "solicits busi
ness" by advertising,12 and "provides a service and solicits the
business of the general public"13-in other words, that she was in
the business of practicing law. By this definition of Nathanson's
practice, her refusal to represent Stropnicky naturally constitutes
just the kind of discrimination prohibited by Section 98.
Yet this view is grossly oversimplified, for it ignores the nature
of the services that Nathanson actually offered to provide. She did
not publicly offer to provide general legal representation to pro
spective clients; she practiced only family law. Neither did she offer
to provide representation in family law matters generally; rather,
she offered only to represent women in family law matters, and
then only from a feminist point of view. Stropnicky, on the other
hand, sought a somewhat different service: representation of him as
the husband in a divorce proceeding to dissolve a nontraditional
marriage.1 4 This is not a service that Nathanson had ever offered to
the public. Nathanson was thus found guilty of violating Section 98
for refusing to provide Stropnicky with a kind of legal representa
tion that she never held herself out as willing to provide, or that she
even claimed she was capable of providing.
If the Agency's decision is to make sense, then, it must rely on
a different understanding of the meaning of "discrimination" under
Section 98. Nathanson's liability must result not from her denial to
Stropnicky of a service she freely provided to others, but from the
fact that the kind of service she offered to provide-feminist-ori
ented representation of women in divorce proceedings-is a kind of
service that Section 98 simply does not permit lawyers to offer. Un
derlying the Hearing Commissioner's ruling, then, is the conclusion
that Nathanson's chosen area of legal specialization was too narrow
in a way that offended Section 98. Presumably, in MCAD's view, a
lawyer may limit her practice to family law, to divorce, to contested
divorce, to the defense of contested divorces, and the like, but not
to the representation of women in those fields of specialization.
The idea that services offered to the public can be so narrow or
specialized as to amount to prohibited discrimination is one that
makes a good deal of sense from the point of view of civil rights
law, for it prevents bigots from escaping liability merely by nar
12. Stropnicky, 19 M.D.L.R. at 39.
13. Id. at 4l.
14. See id. at 39-40.
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rowly defining the services they choose to offer to the public. It
would make little sense to interpret a statute like Section 98 to pro
hibit the racially discriminatory denial of restaurant service, for ex
ample, but to permit restaurants to avoid liability by deliberately
and openly offering to serve only whites, or by characterizing their
service as specializing in the culinary needs of whites. Racially seg
regated service is clearly ont;! of the main targets of Sections 98 and
92A. This approach makes just as much sense when applied to the
practice of law. Lawyers should no more be able than hotels or
restaurants to offer whites-only service, and MCAD's finding that
Stropnicky had made out a prima facie case of discrimination seems
unobjectionable to the extent that it forces lawyers, like any other
entrepreneurs, to justify their service policies.
MCAD, however, went considerably beyond merely holding
that a female-only form of legal service made out a prima facie case
under Section 98: it held that liability followed automatically be
cause there was no conceivable justification, within the contempla
tion of the statute, for maintaining a law practice open only to
women. IS Such a ruling has extremely serious consequences for the
practice of all areas of civil rights law. For example, by MCAD's
reasoning, Section 98 would permit a lawyer to limit his practice to
vote dilution claims, but not to vote dilution claims on behalf of
racial minorities. Thus, a voting rights lawyer who had dedicated
his practice to seeking fair representation for blacks through the
creation of majority-minority election districts would, under
MCAD's reading of Section 98, be unable to turn away white plain
tiffs who sought to challenge such districts under Shaw v. Reno .16
Similarly, a lawyer could choose to specialize in the defense of child
neglect cases, but not to specialize in the defense of such cases
brought against Christian Scientists. What MeAD seems to be say
ing, in other words, is that Section 98 condemns a legal service as
discriminatory where the boundaries of a lawyer's practice coincide
with the traits that make a group a protected class under the stat
ute. This view, I believe, rests on a very poor interpretation of Sec
tion 98, one that should not be attributed to the legislature.
15. This approach is implicit in the Hearing Commissioner's repeated insistence
that Nathanson's denial of representation to Stropnicky could not under Section 98 be
considered anything other than the denial of service solely on the basis of the client's
gender. See id. at 41-42.
16. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). The Court held in Shaw that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits the use of race-conscious districting to increase the electoral power of
blacks at the expense of whites. See id. at 642-44.

SECTION 98 AND CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

1998]

II.
A.

43

THE WEAKNESS OF THE AGENCY'S ApPROACH

The Meaningfulness of Civil Rights Specialization

The notion that specialization in the provision of services to
the public can by itself amount to wrongful discrimination derives
its power from a simple proposition: the traits that distinguish mem
bers of protected groups are irrelevant to their ability to enjoy the
offered services. What converts otherwise harmless specialization
into undesirable discrimination is the belief that a person's capacity
to derive the benefits of a restaurant meal, a hotel room, a library, a
department store, or even the professional services of a doctor or
dentist, is unaffected by his or her race, religion, ethnicity, gender,
or sexual orientation. On this view, "specialization" in the needs of
whites, men, or heterosexuals can only be a pretext for naked dis
crimination, since this kind of specialization in the provision of
food, housing or dentistry is not meaningfully possible.
In general, legal services are justifiably treated in a similar way.
A client's race, ethnicity and gender will for the most part be irrele
vant to a lawyer's representation of that client for purposes of draft
ing a will or lease, handling a real estate closing, or bringing a
personal injury suit. Thus, a lawyer's claim to specialize in the rep
resentation of whites or males in real estate transactions ought to
provoke serious skepticism.
The similarity between law and other fields breaks down, how
ever, when it comes to legal representation in civil rights cases in
volving discrimination. A discrimination case is one to which the
client's race, ethnicity or gender is by definition not only relevant,
but crucial-the entire case revolves around the trait in question.
While the legal principles of nondiscrimination hold constant for
any class of citizens protected by antidiscrimination laws like Sec
tion 98, it by no means follows that the factual issues, applications
of law to fact, means of discovery, methods of proof, or strategies of
settlement that arise in the prosecution of a civil rights case are the
same for all protected classes. Surely the means used to discrimi
nate against lesbians, for example, differs from the means used to
discriminate against Asians or Muslims. Like anything else, dis
crimination is identified by reference to the context in which people
act, and there is no reason to assume that a lawyer who has profes
sional experience working in the context in which one kind of dis
crimination occurs will be familiar with or nearly as effective
working in the contexts in which other kinds of discrimination oc
cur. For example, one kind of evidence of the existence of discrimi
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nation is the use of superficially neutral code words. In some cases,
the use of certain language can by itself constitute unlawful discrim
ination, as in the creation of a hostile workplace environmentP
There is simply no good reason to suppose that a lawyer who has
specialized in workplace discrimination against women, and has in
vested the time and effort necessary to learn the code words and
language of discrimination, the extensive body of law governing the
area, and the strategies necessary to ferret out sufficient evidence of
discrimination to mount a compelling case, will be nearly as effec
tive handling a workplace discrimination case on behalf of a Bud
dhist or a gay man. I am not suggesting that such a lawyer would be
completely incompetent outside her narrowest field of specializa
tion, the way a tax lawyer might be incompetent to represent a
criminal defendant. I am suggesting, though, that a lawyer who spe
cializes in the civil rights claims of Mexican-Americans could do a
better job of representing a Mexican-American in a civil rights case
than could a lawyer who specializes in the civil rights claims of wo
men or fundamentalist Christians. Thus, the practice of civil rights
law is different from the provision of restaurant or hotel services in
that the customer's race, religion or gender may greatly affect his or
her ability to obtain the benefits of the offered service.
B.

MeAD's Errors of Statutory Interpretation

Once we recognize the differences between the practice of civil
rights law and the provision of other kinds of services or the prac
tice of other kinds of law, the shortcomings of MCAD's interpreta
tion of Section 98 become evident. In Stropnicky, the Agency
construed a civil rights statute in a way that curtails the effective
ness and availability of civil rights representation, a result that the
legislature could not have intended the statute to accomplish.
First and foremost, the kind of civil rights subspecialty that N a
thanson claimed to practice simply does not implicate the central
policy concerns of antidiscrimination law embodied in Section 98.
The main purpose of Section 98 is to bar those who provide services
to the public from turning away customers solely on the basis of
certain traits like race or color. Application of this principle to the
practice of law means that lawyers should not be permitted to turn
down cases they would otherwise take solely on the basis of these
prohibited criteria. But Nathanson did not decline to represent
Stropnicky solely because of his gender; she declined to represent
17.

See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
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him because his case was not one that she would ordinarily have
taken, and she would not ordinarily have taken his case because it
fell outside her chosen area of civil rights specialization.
Second, as a matter of public policy, any statute-but espe
cially civil rights statutes-should be read to encourage effective
civil rights representation. 18 MeAD's ruling in Stropnicky does just
the opposite. In Massachusetts, as elsewhere, statutes should be in
terpreted so as to effectuate their purpose. 19 The purpose of Sec
tion 98 is obviously to provide legal protection for the civil rights of
members of groups that are commonly the object of discrimination.
But Section 98 does so not merely by declaring an abstract right to
be free from certain kinds of discrimination, but by making those
rights enforceable within a legal regime consisting of enforcement
by a state agency20 and review by the state jUdiciary.21 Such a sys
tem necessarily contemplates that those who have had their statu
tory rights violated will seek vindication of those rights with the
assistance of counsel.
Perversely, the interpretation of Section 98 offered in
Stropnicky only thwarts the ability of civil rights plaintiffs to obtain
effective representation. It does so in two ways. First, by prohibit
ing civil rights lawyers from specializing in the problems facing
members of particular protected classes, the Agency's interpreta
tion curtails the ability of civil rights lawyers to develop the kinds of
specific expertise that would make them as effective as possible in
pursuing the interests of their clients. It is hard to see why the legis
lature, in its regulation of the legal profession, would allow mem
bers of the public to retain lawyers with extremely narrow expertise
in the most arcane areas of tax, bankruptcy, securities, or environ
mental law, but would remand those seeking representation in civil
rights matters to generalists.
Second, the Agency's interpretation of Section 98 would curtail
the availability of civil rights representation by forcing lawyers like
Nathanson to take on cases they would otherwise decline. One of
the cold facts of civil rights law is that few lawyers choose it as a
18. For example the Supreme Judicial Court recognized this principle in Concord
Rod & Gun Club, Inc. v. MCAD, 524 N.E.2d 1364 (Mass. 1988), where it held that
Section 92A is to be read subject to a "rule of liberal construction." Id. at 1367.
19. See Everett Town Taxi, Inc. v. Board of Aldermen, 320 N.E.2d 896 (Mass.
1974) (courts have a duty "to construe a legislative act so as to effectuate fully the
statutory purpose").
20. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 5 (1997) (MCAD jurisdiction over Section
98 claims).
21. See id. § 6 Uudicial review of MCAD rulings).
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specialty. Public interest law of any kind pays poorly, and civil
rights law is no exception, especially when potential clients are dis
proportionately drawn from society's most disadvantaged sectors.
This, of course, is why so many legislatures are forced to dangle the
promise of attorney fees to induce lawyers to take civil rights
cases.22 MeAD's interpretation of Section 98 takes a bad situation
and makes it worse. It forces those few lawyers who have made the
commitment to civil rights law to spend their very limited time on
cases that they would not otherwise take, thus inevitably crowding
out claims that the lawyers believe deserve representation. This in
turn forces potential clients either to abandon possibly meritorious
claims or to shop them around to practitioners with lesser expertise
who specialize in other areas, with a concomitant reduction in the
effectiveness of the representation obtained.
Perhaps the ultimate irony of MeAD's interpretation of Sec
tion 98 is that it can only hurt the Agency itself in the long run.
Section 98 identifies a plethora of protected classes having little in
common except their experience as frequent targets of discrimina
tion. In so doing, Section 98 practically invites lawyers to develop
subspecialties in the various kinds of claims that fall within the stat
ute's wide scope. Moreover, MeAD itself would clearly benefit
from such specialization: a claim before the Agency will likely be
better and more efficiently litigated if it is handled by an exper
ienced lawyer with a well-developed subspecialty in that particular
kind of claim. By hindering the development of such subspecialties,
the Agency's position in Stropnicky can only harm the quality of
advocacy in cases that MeAD is likely to hear, including cases like
Stropnicky itself.
In light of these considerations, a far better interpretation of
Section 98 is one that would allow lawyers to rebut a prima facie
showing of discrimination by gemonstrating that they are bona fide
specialists in particular areas of civil rights law. This, indeed, was
precisely Nathanson's defense. 23 In my view, the only questions le
gitimately before the Agency were whether the feminist-oriented
representation of women on family law issues is properly consid
ered a branch of civil rights law-a question I would answer affirm
atively-and the factual question of whether Nathanson actually
22. The Massachusetts legislature itself provided for the award of attorney fees in
suits brought to enforce Section 98 and other state antidiscrimination statutes. See id.
§ 9.

23. See Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39, 41 (MeAD
Feb. 25, 1997).
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specialized in that area of law, a contention that Stropnicky appar
ently did not dispute.
CONCLUSION

Civil rights lawyers should be rewarded for their sacrifices, not
punished by being forced to take cases outside their chosen area of
specialization. Similarly, civil rights litigants should be able to ob
tain the best possible representation from lawyers who have had the
opportunity to develop the greatest possible expertise in the kinds
of claims for which those litigants seek representation. MCAD's
interpretation of Section 98 achieves the opposite effects, and does
so, ironically, through the misinterpretation of one of the state's
most important civil rights statutes, a statute designed to improve,
not to thwart, the ability of victims of discrimination to obtain
redress.

